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Abstract A (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing (QSS) is proposed based
on a single d-level quantum system. It enables the (t, n) threshold structure
based on Shamir’s secret sharing and simply requires sequential communica-
tion in d-level quantum system to recover secret. Besides, the scheme provides
a verification mechanism which employs an additional qudit to detect cheats
and eavesdropping during secret reconstruction, and allows a participant to
use the share repeatedly. Analyses show that the proposed scheme is resistant
to typical attacks. Moreover, the scheme is scalable in participant number
and easier to realize compared to related schemes. More generally, our scheme
also presents a generic method to construct new (t, n) threshold QSS schemes
based on d-level quantum system from other classical threshold secret sharing.
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1 Introduction
Suppose a dealer needs to share a secret message among a group of users but
does not want any single user to have the whole secret. How can the dealer
achieve this goal without directly allocating a copy to any user? A desirable
method is to distribute a shadow derived from the secret to each user, such that
some certain number of users can cooperate to recover the secret while fewer
users cannot obtain any information of the secret. To address the problem
of confidentiality and robustness in keeping a secret among users, Shamir [1]
and Blakely [2] proposed the well-defined (t, n) threshold secret sharing [(t,
n)-SS] scheme independently in 1979, with two criteria should be respected.
The first one is reliability, meaning the scheme should allow at least t users
can recover the secret. The second criterion is confidentiality, it means less
than t users should not gain any information about the secret (even with
unlimited computation resource). Today, (t, n)-SS has become a fundamental
cryptographic primitive and been widely used in many applications such as
group authentication [3], threshold signature [4, 5], group key agreement [6],
threshold encryption [7], secure multiparty computation [8], etc.
In recent years, quantum cryptography has attracted much attention due
to its inherent security. Based on physical laws such as Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle and the resulted quantum no-cloning theorem, quantum cryp-
tographic protocols are able to provide unconditional security while classical
ones usually have computational security based on computational complex-
ity. Thus, using quantum-information-assisted schemes, i.e., quantum secret
sharing (QSS), to share secrets among users is more reliable and promising.
Furthermore, QSS provides a robust and secure solution for quantum state
storage and computation [9]. Such scheme was first proposed by Hillery et
al. [10] in 1999, which takes advantage of a three-qubit entangled Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. In the scheme, a GHZ triplet is split and each
of the other two participants get a particle. Both participants are allowed to
measure their particles in either x or y basis (natural basis) and their results
are combined to give the dealer’s measurement result. In this way, a joint se-
cret is established between the dealer and corresponding users. Following the
similar idea, the QSS is further generalized to d-level platform [11] by utilizing
multiparticle (> 3) entanglement GHZ state. Subsequently, another QSS [12]
was proposed using the d-dimensional GHZ state in a different way, in which
participants use an X-basis measurement and classical communication to dis-
tinguish two orthogonal states and reconstruct the original secret. However,
these entanglement-based schemes are all poor in scalability because it gets
difficult to keep quantum correlations among more and more participants. Ob-
viously, supporting such QSS with more participants requires more entangled
state to be prepared, however, with the increase of the number of qubits, en-
tangled state preparation becomes much more difficult. Moreover, quantum
correlations are prone to be spoiled through interacting with environment.
Currently, many existing QSS schemes are of (n, n) type [10–20] including
some experimental demonstrations [21–24], which requires all n shareholders,
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instead of any t or more than t shareholders, to cooperate in recovering the
secret. Therefore, they are less flexible than (t, n) ones and has limited applica-
tions. Since the first threshold QSS [9] was proposed, there have been mainly
two methods to construct threshold QSS. The first method is purely using
some special quantum systems [9, 25–30] in schemes’ construction. For exam-
ple, in the seminal work [9], an arbitrary three-dimensional quantum state (or
qutrit) was employed to construct a (2, 3) threshold scheme, which maps the
private qutrit to three qutrits and each resulted qutrit is taken as a share. The
second method is incorporating classical threshold SS with quantum opera-
tions and thus keep (t, n) threshold structure [31–35]. These schemes employ
quantum operations to embed private value and shares of classical threshold
SS into quantum states, such that t or more than t participants can recover
the initial quantum state to gain the secret only after they each complete their
operations. The first threshold QSS scheme based on Shamir’s (t, n)-SS was
proposed in [31]. In this scheme, a secret is initially embedded into quantum
states; then, any t or more than t participants sequentially apply Hadamard
transformation and proper rotation operations on the quantum state; finally
the secret can be regained after applying certain measurements on the state.
Several quantum computation algorithms, such as phase shift operation or
Quantum Fourier Transform, are also introduced to embed classical shares
into quantum states [32–34].
In this paper, we propose a (t, n) threshold QSS scheme based on a single
d-level quantum system, where dimension d is an odd prime number. In our
scheme, the dealer generates n shares from a secret and allocates each share
to shareholders as in Shamir’s (t, n)-SS. To recover the secret, at least t par-
ticipants perform proper unitary operations (in some order) sequentially on
a vector of a set of Mutually Unbiased (orthonormal) Bases (MUBs); subse-
quently, the qudit is measured in an appointed basis by the last participant.
After the announcement of measurement result, participants exchange ran-
dom numbers embedded in the qudit such that they can recover the dealer’s
secret. To guarantee the security against eavesdropping and cheats, a verifi-
cation mechanism is established which uses an additional qudit to check the
consistency of recovered secrets. Compared with existing QSS schemes, our
scheme stands out for the following properties:
(i) It is more general and practicable than 2-level QSS; moreover, private
shares can be used repeatedly.
(ii) It is scalable in the number of participants compared with schemes based
on entangled states.
(iii) As a (t, n) threshold QSS, it is more flexible in application than (n,
n)-QSS;
(iv) Based on the verification mechanism, it does not depend on any trusted
third party and is able to detect any cheat and eavesdropping during
secret reconstruction.
(v) Other classical (t, n)-SS schemes can be used to replace Shamir’s scheme
while keeping all the aforementioned properties.
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2 Secret sharing based on a single d-level quantum system
2.1 The cyclic property of the MUBs
In this paper, we construct a (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme
based on a set of MUBs which has the cyclic property [13]. It has been
proven that d + 1 MUBs can be found in a d-dimension complex vector
space if d is an odd prime [36, 37]. Besides the computational basis {|j〉 , j =
0, 1, ..., d− 1}, the explicit forms of the remaining d sets of MUBs are ∣∣ϕlk〉 =
1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 ω
j(l+kj) |j〉, where k = 0, 1, ..., d− 1 labels the basis, l = 0, 1, ..., d− 1
enumerates the vectors of the given basis and ω = e2pii/d is the dth root of
unity. For any two values l 6= l′, these MUBs have the following property
〈
ϕl
k
∣∣ ϕl′k〉 = 0, (1)
and this indicates that
∣∣ϕkl 〉 may serve as a basis. Moreover, they are mutually
unbiased because ∣∣∣〈ϕlk∣∣ ϕl′k′〉∣∣∣2 = 1
d
(2)
holds for l 6= l′ and k 6= k′. Beside from the viewpoint of bra-ket notation, Eq.
(2) can also be inferred from Number Theory due to
∣∣∣∑d−1j=0 ωpj+qj2 ∣∣∣ = √d for
p, q ∈ Z, q 6= 0 and prime number d.
The set of MUBs has a cyclic property, i.e., there exist unitary opera-
tions Ul′k′ for any l
′, k′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., d − 1} transforming a given vector
∣∣ϕlk〉
into
∣∣∣ϕl+l′k+k′〉. Specifically, the operations Xd = ∑d−1r=0 ωr |r〉 〈r| and Yd =∑d−1
r=0 ω
r2 |r〉 〈r| can transform the vector
∣∣ϕlk〉 into ∣∣ϕl+1k〉 and ∣∣ϕlk+1〉 re-
spectively due to
Xd
∣∣ϕlk〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
r=0
ωr |r〉 〈r|
d−1∑
j=0
ωj(l+kj) |j〉
=
1√
d
d−1∑
r,j=0
ωrωj(l+kj) |r〉δrj
=
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ωj[(l+1)+kj] |j〉 =
∣∣ϕl+1k〉 ,
(3)
while the correctness of Yd can be proven in the same way. As a result, the
unitary operations U l′k′ is just the combination of those two operators Ul′k′ =
Xd
l′Yd
k′ and note that [Xd, Yd] = 0 guarantees the definition of exponents.
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2.2 Threshold secret sharing based on qudits
2.2.1 Overview
The scheme is constructed based on the cyclic property of MUBs and clas-
sical (t, n)-SS. Initially, each shareholder is allocated a share generated from
a private value (i.e., the secret in classical secret sharing). Then, the dealer
prepares three qudits and embeds two secrets and a verification value into
each qudit respectively, moreover, each qudit also includes the same private
value. These qudits are delivered along a line of at least t participants. On
receiving the qudits, each participant performs unitary operations related to
the share on the qudits. On one hand, an operation add a random number to
each secret and the verification value, on the other hand, the private value in
each qudit is eliminated due to classical (t, n)-SS after at least t participants
complete their unitary operations. Subsequently, the last participant measures
the three qudits and publishes the measurement results to all participants. Fi-
nally, all participants recover the two secrets and the verification value after
disclosing their respective random numbers. Each participant is able to check
the correctness of the two secrets by the verification value, and thus can detect
any cheats and eavesdropping during secret reconstruction.
2.2.2 Proposed scheme
The scheme consists of two phases, Classical private share distribution and
Secret sharing, and we present each phase in detail as follows.
Classical private share distribution phase. In this phase, dealer Alice dis-
tributes classical private shares to n shareholders Bobj, j = 1, 2, ..., n.
(i) Alice picks a random polynomial f(x) of degree at most (t−1) over finite
field GF(d):
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ ...+ at−1xt−1 mod d,
where s = a0 = f(0) is the private value and all coefficients aj , j =
0, 1, ..., t− 1, are in the finite field GF(d) for a large prime d.
(ii) Alice computes f(xj) as the share of shareholder Bobj for j = 1, 2, ..., n,
where xj ∈ GF(d) is the public information of Bobj with xj 6= xr for
j 6= r. n, (n ≥ t), is the total number of shareholders. A shareholder is
also called participant when it participates in secret reconstruction.
(iii) Alice sends each share f(xj) to the corresponding shareholder Bobj
through private channel, which guarantees shares are delivered securely
from Alice to shareholders.
Secret sharing phase. The dealer Alice first prepares three identical states
|Φv〉 =
∣∣ϕ00〉 = 1√d∑d−1j=0 |j〉, v = 1, 2, 3, and then shares secrets S1, S2 ∈
GF(d) and a check value N ∈ GF(d) among m, (m ≥ t) shareholders by
taking the following steps.
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(i) Alice performs the operations Up0vq0v = Xd
p0
v
Yd
q0
v
on |Φv〉 , which
transform the states |Φv〉 into |Φv〉0 =
∣∣ϕp0vq0v〉, where p01 = S1, p02 =
S2, p0
3 = N , q0
1 = q0
2 = q0
3 = d − s with p0v, q0v ∈ GF(d), S1 =
S2N mod d.
(ii) Suppose that Alice needs to share secrets S1, S2 among m (m ≥ t)
participants {Bobj , j = 1, 2, ...,m}, she sends the three states |Φv〉0
to Bob1. Upon receiving the three states, Bob1 performs operations
Up1vq1v on |Φv〉0 respectively, where p1v are mutually independent ran-
dom numbers, q1
v = c1 = f(x1)
∏m
r=2
xr
xr−x1 mod d, v = 1, 2, 3, and
p1
v, q1
v ∈ GF(d). As a result, the states |Φv〉0 are transformed into
|Φv〉1 =
∣∣ϕ(p0v+p1v)(q0v+q1v)〉. Bob1 delivers the states |Φv〉1 to Bob2.
(iii) Each of the other participants Bobj, j = 2, 3, ...,m, repeats the same pro-
cedure sequentially as Bob1 does in (ii). That is, Bobj performs the op-
erations Upjvqjv on |Φv〉j−1 accordingly and thus gets the states |Φv〉j =∣∣∣ϕ∑j
r=0 pr
v
∑j
r=0 qr
v
〉
, where pj
v, qj
v ∈ GF(d) , pjv are mutually indepen-
dent random numbers, qj
v = cj = f(xj)
∏m
r=1,r 6=j
xr
xr−xj mod d. Subse-
quently, Bobj send |Φv〉j to next participant Bobj+1, j = 2, 3, ...,m− 1.
(iv) Consequently, the last participant Bobm keeps the three states and chooses
the basis
{∣∣ϕl0〉}l to measure these three states. The results are labeled
R1, R2, R3 respectively and then Bobm publishes the results.
(v) The measurement basis is
{∣∣ϕl0〉}l due to
m∑
j=0
qj = d− s+
m∑
j=1
cj mod d = 0 mod d. (4)
In this case, measurement results R1, R2, R3 and the random numbers
pj
1, pj
2, pj
3, j = 0, 1, ...,m satisfy
m∑
j=0
pj
v = Rv mod d, v = 1, 2, 3. (5)
After all m participants exchange their random numbers, they obtain
the values p0
1 = R1 −
∑m
j=1 pj
1, p0
2 = R2 −
∑m
j=1 pj
2 and p0
3 = R3 −∑m
j=1 pj
3 respectively.
(vi) To check the correctness of the values p0
1, p0
2 and p0
3, each participant
can verify whether the following equation holds
p0
1 = p0
2p0
3 mod d. (6)
If it does, the secret sharing attempt is not corrupt and thus all partic-
ipants share the dealer’s secrets S1 = p0
1, S2 = p0
2; otherwise they are
aware that the secret sharing is invalid and abort this round.
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2.2.3 Correctness of the scheme
The scheme is correct because, after the dealer and all m (m ≥ t) participants
complete their operations, each final state becomes
|Φ〉m =
(
m∏
r=0
Xd
pr
v
Yd
qr
v
)
|Φ〉
=
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω
∑m
r=0 (jpr
v+j2qr
v) |j〉,
(7)
for v = 1, 2, 3.
Besides, all participants in Shamir’s (t, n)-SS can recover the secret by
summing up all components. i.e.,
s = f(0) =
m∑
j=1
cj mod d =
m∑
j=1
f(xj)
m∏
r=1,r 6=j
xr
xr − xj mod d, (8)
which can be immediately obtained by Lagrange interpolation formula.
Thus we have
∑m
j=1 cj = Nd + s,N ∈ Z, so the Eq.(4) holds. Then due
to Eq.(4) which is
∑m
j=0 qj = 0 mod d, it follows that when Bobm measures
the final states in the basis
{∣∣ϕl0〉}l, he obtains the real results satisfying
Eq.(6). Finally, with published results, all m participants can recover secrets
by exchanging their random numbers. Here, the proposed scheme satisfies
reliability, the first criteria of a well-defined (t, n)-SS since it allows at least t
participants recovering the secret.
3 Security analysis
In this section, we show that our scheme is perfect and secure against various
attack strategies including intercept-resend attack, participant attack and joint
attack. Then we will analyze the validity of the verification mechanism against
cheat and eavesdropping.
3.1 Confidentiality analysis
Here, we mainly prove the perfect security of the scheme. A (t, n)-QSS scheme
is perfect with respect to the probability distribution of secret over secret space
if less than t participants obtains no information about the secret.
Theorem 1. The proposed (t, n)-QSS scheme is perfect with respect to the
probability distribution of secret over secret space. That is,
I(Sv;Ω) = H(Sv)−H(Sv|Ω) = 0 (9)
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where Ω denotes the set of shares available for less than t − 1 participants,
H(Sv) is the information entropy of the secret Sv, v = 1, 2 and I(Sv;Ω) rep-
resents the mutual information of Sv with Ω.
Proof : Suppose that m(m ≥ t) participants {Bobj , j = 1, 2, ...,m}, with the
corresponding shares {f(xj), j = 1, 2, ...,m}, collaborate to recover each secret
Sv, v = 1, 2 in normal case.
Without losing generality, assume exactly t − 1 participants {Bobj , j =
1, 2, ..., t − 1} conspire in the attack and Bobt−1 measures |Φv〉t−1. But only
with true measurement basis which is no longer the appointed basis
{∣∣ϕl0〉}l,
they can get correct results; otherwise due to Eq.(2), they will get the correct
results with the probability 1/d. The key point is that the measurement basis
is encoded by the private value s used in Classical private share distribution
phase. But according to Shamir’s [1] (t, n)-SS, for m ≥ t, each private value
s =
m∑
j=1
f(xj)
m∏
r=1,r 6=j
xr
xr − xj mod d, (10)
and s is uniformly distributed over GF(d) if t − 1 participants {Bobj , j =
1, 2, ..., t − 1} conspire. That is, with the shares Ω = {f(xj), j = 1, 2, ..., t −
1} available, they have the probability P (s|Ω) = 1/d to obtain s. Further,
they can get correct results and random numbers exchanged from others, then
recover the secrets. Thus the probability to obtain Sv is 1/d. As a result, we
have conditional entropy H(Sv|Ω) = log d.
On the other hand, since pv0 is uniformly and randomly selected from
GF(d) by Alice from the view of participants, hence, Sv = pv0 is indis-
tinguishable from a random variable uniformly distributed over GF(d), i.e.,
P (Sv) = 1/d. Consequently, the entropy of Sv is H(Sv) = log d.
Therefore, we finally have
I(Sv;Ω) = H(Sv)−H(Sv|Ω) = 0. (11)
Since both secrets Sv, v = 1, 2 and the verification value S3 all satisfy the
above equation, the proposed scheme is perfect with respect to probability dis-
tribution of secrets in the secret space GF(d). Here, the criteria confidentiality
is satisfied.
Overall, we can see that with respecting the two criteria, the proposed
scheme is a well-defined (t, n) QSS.
3.2 Intercept-resend attack
Here, we consider the intercept-resend attack mounted by an external eaves-
dropper Eve. She may intercept the qudit
∣∣ϕlk〉 sent from Bobj to Bobj+1,
but with no information about the measurement basis. Obviously, Eve can
obtain the correct measurement result only when she happens to choose the
true basis k′ = k, which has the probability of 1/d. Moreover, the correct
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measurement result is the sum of dealer’s secret and preceding participants’
random numbers, she can infer the dealer’s secret only with the probability
1/d if she doesn’t know these random numbers. Relatively, she will fail and
change the qudit sent to Bobj+1 with probability (d− 1)/d. Then it will cause
contradiction to Eq.(6) and thus be detected in step (vi) in the scheme. In
a word, Eve cannot figure out the secret with the probability more than 1/d
in intercept-resend attack. Obviously, the scheme is more secure for a larger
prime d.
3.3 Participant attack
A simple attack strategy a participant may take is using a random number, in-
stead of the component cj generated by his own share, in the unitary operation.
However, this attack will not be effective since the Eq.(4) is violated and thus
the last participant Bobm cannot obtain correct measurement results with the
basis
{∣∣ϕl0〉}l. That is, the published measurement results are random num-
bers in GF(d). Therefore, after participants exchange random numbers, they
all get wrong secrets. Consequently, this attack will be detected in step (vi)
because of the violation of Eq.(6).
Considering that the first participant Bob1 tries to infer the dealer’s secrets
alone by measuring qudits sent directly from the dealer. In this case, with
only one share (i.e., less than t shares), he cannot recover the private value
s previously embedded in qudits by the dealer, because Shamir’s (t, n)-SS is
perfect [38], i.e., no information about the secret can be obtained in Shamir’s
(t, n)-SS with less than t shares. Thus, he can never measure the qudits in true
basis but only to guess with the neglible probability 1/d. It means this attack
works to get secret with probability 1/d which is the same to guess the secret.
The last participant is at the special role in the proposed scheme, with the
opportunity to measure the qudits in true basis. Thus in section 3.5, we will
analyze the attack mounted by the last participant, which is more challenging
to the scheme’s security.
3.4 Joint attack
Considering the joint attack taken by part of participants in association with
entanglement swapping [39,40], they could entangle the qudit with an ancilla
(e.g. Bell states), or use new entangled states to replace the qudits. However,
they benefit nothing from this attack, because less than t shares cannot re-
cover the private value s, even though entanglement swapping renders the
qudits available for cheaters in a mixed state, there is no observable result ob-
tained. As a result, they will face the problems that possessing no knowledge
on measurement basis and also that they cannot achieve random numbers used
by other honest participants. Furthermore, this attack can be detected in step
(vi) because the basis
{∣∣ϕl0〉}l is wrong and consequently the recovered values
do not satisfy p0
1 = p0
2p0
3 mod d.
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3.5 Verification mechanism
The last participant Bobm is crucial to our scheme because he is responsible
for keeping and measuring the qudits in true basis. So, he is able to deceive the
other participants by announcing wrong measurement results. Of course, other
participant can also cheat by using a wrong share in secret reconstruction.
Moreover, the qudits are obviously vulnerable to eavesdropping. Thus it is
necessary to establish appropriate verification mechanism to detect cheat or
eavesdropping. As mentioned above, the proposed scheme uses Eq.(6) as the
verification mechanism.
Let consider the error rate of verification mechanism, i.e., the probability
that the verification mechanism does not detect wrong secrets.
For correct measurement results Rv and the corresponding sums of ran-
dom numbers of all participants, Nv =
∑m
j=1 pj
v, v = 1, 2, 3, assume that the
last participant Bobm publishes wrong measurements Rv
′ 6= Rv, v = 1, 2, 3.
Obviously, if (R1
′ −N1) = (R2′ −N2)(R3′ −N3) mod d happens to hold, the
wrong measurement results cannot be detected. In this case, the verification
mechanism fails and thus the other participants recover wrong secrets without
being detected.
Obviously, if Bobm randomly and uniformly chooses three values R1
′, R2′
and R3
′ in GF(d) as measurement results and publishes them to the other par-
ticipants, there are totally d3 tuples of {R1′, R2′, R3′}. Note that Rv are pub-
lished before all participants exchange their random values pj
v, j = 1, 2, ...,m,
to obtain the sums Nv. Since each participant Bobj picks its random values
pj
v privately and independently, Nv =
∑m
j=1 pj
v , are indistinguishable from
random numbers uniformly distributed in GF(d) in the view of all partici-
pants. As a result, (Rv
′−Nv) are also indistinguishable from random numbers
uniformly distributed in GF(d) for participants. In this case, there are totally
d2 randomly selected tuples of {R1′, R2′, R3′} satisfying
(R1
′ −N1) = (R2′ −N2)(R3′ −N3) mod d, (12)
because, given {N1, N2, N3}, R3′ can always be determined for randomly se-
lected pairs of {R1′, R2′}.
The result is the same if any other participant cheats by using a wrong
share when performing operations on quantum states.
Therefore, the error rate of the verification mechanism is d2/d3 = 1/d.
Since d is a large prime, the error rate converges to 0 when d approaches to
infinity.
In conclusion, the scheme can detect the cheat by participants with the
probability (d− 1)/d, which converges to 100% if d approaches to infinity.
4 Comparisons and discussion
There are many QSS schemes, but most of them are 2-level [10,14–16,22,31,32]
and with (n, n) structure [10–20,22]. For instance, in the scheme [22], the au-
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thors use phase shift operation to embed the secret into a single qubit such
that the secret can be recovered after all participants complete their opera-
tions. Besides, a special QSS based on Grover quantum searching algorithm
was proposed in [14]. But these 2-level schemes have less universality and prac-
ticability when compared to d-level ones and (n, n) structure QSS schemes
are less flexible than (t, n) ones in the sense that, other than any t parties,
all shareholders must be present to recover the secret. Compared with these
schemes, our d-level (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme is more
flexible, universal and practicable. Hence, the following parts concern about
d-level or (t, n) threshold structure schemes.
The scheme in [11] initially prepares a high-fidelity entangled GHZ state
with n subsystems. Once the state is produced, the number of participants
is fixed. Yu et al. presented another QSS [12] based on d-dimensional GHZ
state, which is also not scalable with the growth of participant number. In
their scheme, an X-basis measurement and classical communication are used
to distinguish two orthogonal states and reconstruct the original secret. Some
d-level schemes [18, 33] were proposed based on Quantum Fourier Transform.
The scheme in [18] disguises each share of a secret with true randomness,
rather than classical pseudo randomness. But schemes using entangled states
will not be scalable with growing participants. Also a common problem of
these schemes is that each participant needs to measure his particle at last, but
some participant may fail in measurement due to inefficient detection and thus
render an invalid secret sharing easily. Compared with these schemes based on
special quantum system, our scheme enjoys a strong scalability because it is
almost not restricted by participant number in realization.
QSS schemes with (t, n) structure was first proposed in 1999 [9] based on
quantum error correcting code. The scheme divides a special quantum state
into n shares, such that any t or more than t participants can recover the initial
state using linear transformation. However, it is hard to map the quantum
state to n quantum states in coding. Later, some other threshold schemes are
proposed with different physical characteristics, such as those in [25–27] benefit
from continuous variable and in [28–30] construct from the ability of exactly
distinguishing orthogonal multipartite entangled states under restricted local
operation and classical communication. Some schemes [31–35] take advantage
of the classical (t, n)-SS, which using phase shift operation to embed the secret
and shares generated from classical (t, n)-SS into processed quantum state, so
after sequential operations, participants can collaborate to recover secret.
Compared with these previous schemes in Table 1, our scheme employs
d-level unitary operation in association with classical (t, n)-SS. Due to the
verification mechanism, it is free from the trusted third party who is respon-
sible for measurement results and any cheat behavior of a participant can be
detected easily.
Thinking further about the proposed scheme, we can find a generic method
to construct such type of d-level threshold QSS schemes. Note that our scheme
employs the classical Shamir’s (t, n) secret sharing, in fact, other classical (t,
n)-secret sharing schemes, such as linear code based (t, n)-SS [41,42], geome-
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Table 1: Comparisons with previous QSSs.
Schemes Ref. [1] Ref. [9] Ref. [10] Ref. [31] Our scheme
Entanglement-free No No Yes Yes
Scalability Yes No No Yes Yes
Level d 2 2 d
(t, n) threshold Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Cheat detection No No No No Yes
try based (t, n)-SS [2], Chinese Remainder Theorem based (t, n)-SS [43, 44],
etc., can also be directly used to construct new threshold QSS schemes based
on a single d-level quantum system. All these new schemes share the same
features as our proposed scheme. Furthermore, each participant, e.g., Bobj,
constructs a component cj from the share and then produces the d-level uni-
tary operations from cj . After each participant completing its d-level uni-
tary operation on a qudit sequentially, all components cj , j = 1, 2, ...m, are
actually added up and the private value s is removed, which ensures that
the last participant Bobm gets the correct measurement result. As a mat-
ter of fact, as long as a classical (t, n)-SS has the property of cumulative
sum, i.e., the secret (i.e., private value in our scheme) s, can be expressed as
s =
∑m
j=1 cj modM =
∑m
j=1 ajsj mod M , it can be used to construct such a
d-level (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing , where cj are the values Bobj
evaluated from the shares sj and aj are some public parameters, m ≥ t is the
number of participants and M is a modulus.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a (t, n) threshold QSS scheme based on a single d-level
quantum system. The scheme simply requires sequential communication of a
single d-level quantum system during secret reconstruction. It is flexible in
application, scalable to participant number and easy to realize. Security anal-
yses show the scheme is secure against typical attacks. Moreover, a verification
mechanism used to verify recovered secrets so that eavesdropping and cheats
can be detected.
By the method of our scheme, new (t, n) threshold QSS schemes based on
a single d-level quantum system can be easily constructed if the Shamir’s (t, n)
secret sharing scheme is replaced by other classical threshold ones.
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